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MINING THE MILKY WAY: HOW TO BRING AMERICA’S
EXTRATERRESTRIAL EXCURSIONS BACK INTO
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
BRADEN ANDERSON*

ABSTRACT
In November of 2015, the 114th United States Congress enacted the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of
2015 (Space Act) and, in turn, thrusted the door to outer space
mining wide open for Americans. Unfortunately, while the
Space Act provided a solution for corporations, it created a dilemma for the United States. As currently enacted, the Space
Act directly conflicts with the world’s foundational and most basic framework for international space law: The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).
To reassure other signatories and to ensure the United States
complies with its international obligations under the Outer
Space Treaty, Congress should establish a centralized regulatory
authority to govern the activities of American entities in outer
space and amend the Space Act to require bonding and permitting processes for entities wishing to engage in asteroid mining.
This Article is the first to analyze how to modify existing legislation to impose sufficient regulation so the United States may
once again comply with its international obligations under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. This Article will show that
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given the inherent risks of outer space mining, the intent and
origins of the Outer Space Treaty, and the conflicting allowances contained in the Space Act, changes must be enacted
to ensure that the tradition of treaty compliance and mineralextraction regulation does not stop at our planet’s troposphere.
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AMERICA, WE HAVE LIFTOFF! BUT SHOULD WE
SHUT DOWN?

I

N NOVEMBER OF 2015, the 114th United States Congress
enacted the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act
of 2015 (Space Act)1 and, in turn, thrusted the door to outer
space mining wide open for Americans.2 Passage of the Space
Act came in response to more than a decade’s worth of American interest in exploitation of asteroid resources and commercialization of outer space.3 The Space Act gave a greenlight to
multiple corporations who, despite having the resources and
technology to begin asteroid mining operations, hesitated to begin due to uncertainty regarding ownership rights of any materials they extracted.4 By providing legal certainty regarding
ownership rights,5 the Space Act became an integral solution to
the economic stalemate in the commercialization of outer
space.6
While the Space Act provided a solution to corporations, it
created a dilemma for the United States. As currently enacted,
the Space Act directly conflicts with the world’s foundational
and most basic framework for international space law: The
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).7 Ratified by 111
countries and signed by 23 others around the globe on its date
of signature,8 the Outer Space Treaty is a pervasive framework
1 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129
Stat. 704 (2015) (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303).
2 See id.
3 See, e.g., Dennis Wingo, The Resources of the Moon and Beyond, SPACE.COM (Feb.
23, 2005), https://www.space.com/816-resources-moon.html [https://
perma.cc/CRY9-JR3D].
4 See Jennifer Hackett, New Law Paves the Way for Asteroid Mining—but Will It
Work?, SCI. AM. (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/newlaw-paves-the-way-for-asteroid-mining-but-will-it-work/ [https://perma.cc/9BEF8X6P].
5 See 51 U.S.C. § 51303.
6 See Hackett, supra note 4.
7 See generally Joshua E. Duke, Conflict and Controversy in the Space Domain: Legalities, Lethalities, and Celestial Security, WILD BLUE YONDER ONLINE J. (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/Article/
2362296/conflict-and-controversy-in-the-space-domain-legalities-lethalities-andcelesti/ [https://perma.cc/3G7J-JYD7].
8 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for
signature Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Jon
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enacted to promulgate principles of global safety and equity.9
Given the Outer Space Treaty’s intentions and objectives, which
include a desire to prevent militarization of space, any breach of
its provisions is worrisome to other signatories; further, failure
of the United States to meet its obligations under the Outer
Space Treaty could prompt other spacefaring nations to abandon their duties as well, threatening the delicate but cardinal
security provided by this legal framework.10
To reassure other signatories and to ensure the United States
complies with its international obligations under the Outer
Space Treaty, Congress should establish a centralized regulatory
authority to govern activities of American entities in outer space
and amend the Space Act to require bonding and permitting
processes for entities wishing to engage in asteroid mining. By
passing the Space Act, which is unusually simplistic and lacks the
specificity usually observed in similar legislation,11 the United
States breached two of the Outer Space Treaty’s key provisions:
the Non-Appropriation Article and the Oversight provision.12
The former, which demands that no signatory appropriate the
moon or any other celestial body “by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or by any other means,”13 is said to
be directly breached by Congress’s allowance of asteroid mineral ownership rights in the Space Act.14 While asteroids were
contemplated during Committee markup hearings, Congress
found asteroids to be outside the scope of the intent of the ArtiKelvey, 55-Years-Ago, the World Wrote the Prime Directives for Outer Space, INVERSE (Jan.
27, 2022, 9:00 AM), https://www.inverse.com/science/what-is-the-outer-spacetreaty [https://perma.cc/EKE7-YV3X].
9 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, pmbl.
10 See infra Section I.B.2 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to and
concerns regarding passage of the Space Act).
11 See The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015 Full Committee
Markup: Hearing on H.R. 1508 Before the H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 114th
Congress 1(2015) [hereinafter Johnson] (Statement of Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Ranking Member), https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/
EBJ%20Open%20Asteroids.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB9F-KYGK] (criticizing simplicity of the bill presented at markup).
12 See Senjuti Mallick & Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, If Space is ‘the Province of
Mankind’, Who Owns its Resources? An Examination of the Potential of Space Mining
and Its Legal Implications, 182 OBSERVER RSCH. FOUND. 1, 12 (2019).
13 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. II.
14 Brooks Hays, New U.S. Space Mining Law May Violate International Treaty, UPI
(Nov. 27, 2015, 11:16 AM) https://www.upi.com/Science_News/2015/11/27/
New-US-space-mining-law-may-violate-international-treaty/8751448634436/
[https://perma.cc/7ZRG-WAQ4].
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cle II Appropriation provision.15 And while important, any remaining, perceived noncompliance with that provision is not
within scope of this Article.
This Article is the first to analyze how to ensure the United
States complies with its international obligations by amending
the Space Act to include adequate regulatory provisions so as to
satisfy Article VI (the oversight requirement) of the Outer Space
Treaty. As you will see in Section II.A.2, Article VI states that
non-governmental entities in outer space must be authorized
and continuously supervised by the country from which they
originate.16 Section II.B will explain that currently, the Space
Act maintains no regulatory or authorization specifications that
would align it with the obligations under the oversight requirement in the Outer Space Treaty.17 The lack of such provisions
not only places the United States in breach of a paramount
treaty establishing the framework for global safety, but it also
enhances the already unique and immense risks inherent in
conducting operations in outer space.18 Part III will discuss how
these risks can be mitigated and the obligations can be met by
the establishment of a centralized regulatory agency for American outer space activities, and by simple but significant amendments to the Space Act to include bonding and permitting
process requirements modeled after existing natural resource
legislation.19
These solutions are soundly based in traditional principles,
applicable to adjustment in outer space. Every section of the energy industry has regulatory and compliance aspects aimed at
balancing interests of safety, economic efficiency, and competition.20 This Article will show that given the inherent risks of
outer space mining, the intent and origins of the Outer Space
H.R. REP. NO. 114-153, at 8, 10 (2015).
See infra Section II.A.2 and accompanying text; Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 8, art. VI.
17 See infra Section II.B and accompanying text; see generally 51 U.S.C. § 51302
(noting lack of regulatory or authorization requirements, other than FAA guidelines, for private entities).
18 See generally Duke, supra note 7.
19 See infra Part III and accompanying text (discussing how a regulatory agency
authorized to implement and enforce bonding and permitting requirements may
help the United States comply with duties imposed by the Outer Space Treaty).
20 Lillian Giering & Vince Flickinger, What We Can Learn from the Energy Industry
About Safety in the New Workplace, GENSLER (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
www.gensler.com/blog/what-we-can-learn-from-the-energy-industry-about-safetyin [https://perma.cc/EB34-6R5V].
15
16
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Treaty, and the conflicting allowances by the Space Act, the U.S.
tradition of regulatory compliance must not stop at our planet’s
troposphere.
II.

A GLANCE BACK BEFORE WE BLAST OFF

Foundationally, it is critical to garner a comprehensive understanding of the key considerations that have, from the beginning and throughout time, shaped today’s social and political
landscapes, attitudes, and proclivities regarding outer space.
Section II.A will examine the intent and requirements underlying the planet’s most prolific and historic space-related treaty,
which forms modern space law’s most basic framework: The
Outer Space Treaty.21 Section II.B will discuss the Space Act and
specifically, the rights it extends to Americans and the strong
responses, both positive and negative, it evokes.22 With a better
understanding of space-specific political climates and perspectives, Section II.C will discuss the future of outer space mining
operations and techniques while detailing the history of natural
resource extraction, its failures, and the applicability of lessons
learned to future extraterrestrial mining projects.23
A.

A BIG DIPLOMATIC BANG: THE OUTER SPACE TREATY

Since the Outer Space Treaty serves as space law’s most foundational basis, understanding its key provisions and impositions
is paramount to understanding the future of outer space mining. Section II.A.1 will highlight the foremost considerations
contemplated by the drafting nations of the treaty, one of which
was the United States, as well as the concerns and expectations
of those that signed it.24 Following the discussion of these
frames of reference, Section II.A.2 will detail the core duties,
primarily the oversight and authorization requirement, imposed
upon signatories by the Outer Space Treaty in Articles II, VI,
and VII.25
21 See infra Section II.A and accompanying text (summarizing the key provisions and considerations of the Outer Space Treaty).
22 See infra Section II.B and accompanying text (summarizing key provisions of
and reactions to the Space Act).
23 See infra Section II.C and accompanying text (summarizing historical considerations in terrestrial mining that may be applicable to mining in outer space).
24 See infra Section II.A.1 and accompanying text (summarizing the origins, obligations, intent, and concerns associated with the Outer Space Treaty).
25 See infra Section II.A.2 and accompanying text (summarizing a signatory’s
duty to supervise its spacefaring entities).
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Origins, Obligations, Intent, and Concerns

The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty, was entered into force on
October 10, 1967,26 and serves as the foundational basis of international space law.27 In total, 111 countries, including all
spacefaring nations around the globe,28 signed and ratified the
Outer Space Treaty.29 The Outer Space Treaty came primarily as
a response to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and threats of militarization of space.30 In the
early 1950s, the introduction of ICBMs meant that for the first
time in the history of mankind, nations could be targeted from
outer space, a possibility that many militaries, if not most, either
did not contemplate or were not prepared to defend against.31
Planetary safety suddenly became a worldwide concern, and with
the Soviet Union’s historic launch of the world’s first artificial
satellite, Sputnik, an arms race between the Soviet Union and
the United States began and prompted immediate efforts to prevent militarization of outer space.32 While demilitarization was a
prominent focus of the Outer Space Treaty, there are several
other aims that can be recognized by the provisions of the
adopted Treaty. Among them is a resounding focus to “prevent
‘a new form of colonial competition’ and the possible damage
that self-seeking exploitation might cause.”33
In recognition of these concerns, the Outer Space Treaty includes several provisions aimed at planetary safety and international equity. To address the former, the Outer Space Treaty
prohibits nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction from
being “place[d] in orbit around the Earth . . . install[ed] . . . on
celestial bodies, or station[ed] in outer space in any other manOuter Space Treaty, supra note 8, addendum 2.
See id. addendum 8.
28 Id.
29 Id.; Kelvey, supra note 8.
30 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, vi.
31 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION, AND COMPLIANCE, https://20092017.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm [https://perma.cc/K8LX-FBVH].
32 Id.
33 Jessica West, Back to the Future: The Outer Space Treaty Turns 40, 28 PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR (2007), https://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/back-to-thefuture-the-outer-space-treaty-turns-40/ [https://perma.cc/5K72-HLW4].
26
27
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ner.”34 Regarding the latter, the Outer Space Treaty makes it
expressly clear that space is open and “free for exploration and
use by all States”35 and that no nation shall appropriate the
moon or any other celestial body “by claim of sovereignty, by means
of use or occupation, or by any other means.”36 These commands and many others reflect the vigorous intent of all signatories to promote peace, international cooperation, and planetary
safety when conducting explorations and dealing with matters in
outer space.37
In efforts to construct meaningful enforcement of equitable
inclusion and safety, the Outer Space Treaty contains several
provisions aimed towards liability and conduct regulation of entities operating in outer space.38 When drafting the Outer Space
Treaty, the depositary governments (the Russian Federation, the
United Kingdom, and the United States)39 carefully examined
and negotiated liability for actions and events occurring in outer
space.40 Currently, any State41 Party that launches an object into
outer space, or “from whose territory or facility an object is
launched, is internationally liable” for any damage resulting to
another State Party from that object or its parts.42 This means, if
a private individual, regardless of formal government affiliation,
launches a satellite into space from within the borders of the
United States or its territories, and that satellite crashes to Earth
causing damage to property or otherwise along the way, the
United States, not the individual, is internationally liable for the
damage caused.43 This liability was imposed by the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention) and is an obvious reflection of
international desire to further expand the scope of already-exOuter Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV.
Id. art. I.
36 Id. art. II.
37 See The Outer Space Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, https://
www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/outerspace [https://perma.cc/A842-8W5Y]
(Oct. 2020) (discussing peaceful intent behind the drafting of the Outer Space
Treaty).
38 Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects pmbl., Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
39 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. XXIV.2.
40 See Liability Convention, supra note 38, pmbl.
41 See States in International Law, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/international-law/States-in-international-law [https://perma.cc/NWE7M6Y4] (defining the term “state” within the context of international law).
42 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. VII.
43 See Liability Convention, supra note 38, pmbl, arts. II–III.
34
35
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isting liability provisions incorporated by the Outer Space
Treaty.44 By putting national governments on the hook for the
actions of those within their sovereign borders, this provision’s
inclusion and expansion specifically highlights the global community’s determination to incentivize spacefaring nations to
regulate their and their constituents’ outer space activities.45
2.

Article VI: The Oversight and Authorization Requirement

With the intent and provisions of the Outer Space Treaty as
described above in mind, it should come as no surprise that the
Treaty also contains an oversight requirement.46 If the liability
provision was not incentivization enough to promote the regulation of outer space activities, Article VI of the Outer Space
Treaty is a direct commandment.47 Article VI expressly states:
“The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State
Party to the Treaty.”48 Article VI thus establishes State responsibility for the oversight of outer space activities conducted by individuals, organizations, and businesses emanating therefrom.49
Therefore, it is commonly, and logically, argued that any State
permitting private, non-governmental entities to launch into
space, is not only liable for any damage the entities may cause,
but also has a duty imported upon it to formulate and promulgate methods of authorization and observation of their extraterrestrial operations.50 What is not so commonly agreed, however,
is to what extent is that authorization and oversight sufficient?51
44 See id. pmbl, art. II (detailing the imposition of liability unto states from with
damage-causing launches originate).
45 See id.
46 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. VI; Michael J. Listner, Op-ed, A
Reality Check on Article VI and Private Space Activities, SPACENEWS (June 6, 2017),
https://spacenews.com/a-reality-check-on-article-vi-and-private-space-activities/
[https://perma.cc/A8EZ-TCRP].
47 Cf. Brian J. Egan, The Next Fifty Years of the Outer Space Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (Dec. 7, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/
264963.htm [https://perma.cc/X77J-WG6R] (acknowledging the burden imposed on states to regulate space activity but suggesting that current safeguards
sufficiently address such concerns).
48 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. VI (emphasis added).
49 See id.; cf. Egan, supra note 47.
50 See, e.g., Egan, supra note 47.
51 See generally Reopening the American Frontier: Exploring How the Outer Space Treaty
Will Impact American Commerce and Settlement in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Space., Sci. & Competitiveness of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 115th Cong.
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ECLIPSING THE ORIGINS: PASSING THE COMMERCIAL SPACE
LAUNCH COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 2015

With a comprehensive understanding of the motives and requirements of the Outer Space Treaty, it is time to examine the
same for the Space Act. Section II.B.1 will explore the fervent
push for passing the Act quickly as well as the economic and
market uncertainty it aims to clear up.52 Contrastingly, Section
II.B.2 will take an in-depth look at the reasons the Space Act was
so vehemently opposed by some legislators, experts, private individuals, and other nations as well as the direct conflict with the
Outer Space Treaty that it imposes.53
1.

Reasons for Passing

Although the Outer Space Treaty clearly establishes damages
liability and imposes a duty upon nations to authorize and supervise non-government entities in space, the lack of privatized
space industry endeavors means that these provisions were
largely of no concern to the United States for many years after
the Outer Space Treaty’s enactment.54 It was not until the 1980s
when the first privately funded rocket was launched into space55
and not until the early 2000s that multiple U.S. companies began to develop launch vehicles and spacecraft.56
However, by 2011, American interest in outer-space-related
profits reached an all-time peak and spurred passionate legislative efforts to create a legally clear path towards outer space
commercialization.57 In 2015, President Barack Obama signed
3–49 (2017) (debating degrees of efficacy and sufficiency of proposed regulatory
efforts).
52 See infra Section II.B.1 and accompanying text (discussing reasons the Space
Act was passed and the problems it sought to solve).
53 See infra Section II.B.2 and accompanying text (discussing points of contention those who do not support the Space Act raise).
54 See Feyisola Ruth Ishola, Oluwabusola Fadipe & Olaoluwa Colin Taiwo, Legal
Enforceability of International Space Laws: An Appraisal of 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 9
NEW SPACE 33, 34 (2021).
55 John C. Abell, Sept. 9, 1982: 3-2-1 . . . Liftoff! The First Private Rocket Launch,
WIRED (Sept. 9, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2009/09/
dayintech0909privaterocket/ [https://perma.cc/K3QG-HS38].
56 See Michael Coren, Private Craft Soars into Space, History, CNN: SCI. & SPACE
(July 14, 2004, 4:14 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/space/06/21/suborbital.test/ [https://perma.cc/87P4-KN3A].
57 See Brian Kennedy, 5 Facts About Americans’ Views on Space Exploration, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (July 14, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/
14/5-facts-about-americans-views-on-space-exploration/ [https://perma.cc/
8YCB-DW2G]; Brian Kennedy & Mark Strauss, Many in U.S. Have Confidence in
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into law the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness
Act (Space Act),58 and changed the landscape of U.S. space exploration. The Space Act’s primary functions were to grant U.S.
companies legal certainty regarding outer space mining and to
foster the ability of the United States to compete with other nations in the development of space mining as a robust, global
industry.59 In doing so, the Space Act legally permits U.S. companies to engage in exploitation of space resources60 and provides that upon extraction, outer space miners are granted
ownership interests in the minerals they recover.61 The Space
Act particularly defines “space resources” as “an abiotic resource
in situ in outer space.”62
Those who supported the Space Act’s quick trip through Congress lauded the legislation as a crucial step in ensuring the
United States does not fall behind other countries’ industry endeavors.63 By the time the Space Act was passed, other countries
had already taken steps towards promoting development of the
space mining industry,64 and for good reason. Asteroids are generally classified into three main categories depending on composition.65 Some contain rare and valuable metals at
What Private Space Companies Will Accomplish, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 22, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/22/many-in-u-s-have-confidence-in-what-private-space-companies-will-accomplish/ [https://perma.cc/
VN26-5SKV].
58 25 November 2015 – President Obama Signs the SPACE Act Into Law, APES IN
SPACE (Nov. 25, 2017), https://apesinspace.co/blogs/space-history/25-november-2015-obama-space-act [https://perma.cc/DH75-LRBB].
59 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90,
129 Stat. 704 (2015) (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303).
60 51 U.S.C. § 51302.
61 Gbenga Oduntan, Who Owns Space? US Asteroid-Mining Act Is Dangerous and
Potentially Illegal, CONVERSATION (Nov. 25, 2015, 6:34 AM), https://theconversation.com/who-owns-space-us-asteroid-mining-act-is-dangerous-and-potentially-illegal-51073 [https://perma.cc/948V-3DH3]; 51 U.S.C. § 51303.
62 51 U.S.C. § 51301(2)(A).
63 See Jacob Aron, US SPACE Act Extends Easy Ride for Commercial Space Ventures,
NEW SCIENTIST (May 22, 2015), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn27583us-space-act-extends-easy-ride-for-commercial-space-ventures/ [https://
perma.cc/T3ND-6FKZ].
64 Debbie Siegelbaum, The Companies Vying to Turn Asteroids into Filling Stations,
BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29334645
[https://perma.cc/K325-KDUJ].
65 Richard J. Bartlett, Different Types of Asteroids (C, S, and M) – The Definitive
Guide, ASTRONOMY SOURCE (Aug. 11, 2020), https://astronomysource.com/different-types-of-asteroids/ [https://perma.cc/SF42-YZLC].
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concentrations much higher than what is found on Earth.66 For
example, 17% of known asteroids are S-Type asteroids.67 These
commonly contain minerals such as nickel, iron, and magnesium silicate mixture.68 One small, ten-meter S-Type asteroid
could contain up to 650,000 kilograms of metal with 50 kilograms in the form of rare metals, such as platinum and gold.69
The rarest of asteroids, M-Types, contain up to ten times the
amount of metal that S-Types do, making them even more valuable.70 Even the most common of asteroids, C-Types, which make
up 75% of known asteroids, have abundances of water.71 While
not immediately used for mining, access to water in space could
be used for rocket-fuel production and aid greatly in efforts to
further exploration beyond currently known asteroids.72
2.

Concerns About Act Passage

However, not all in Congress or elsewhere approved of the
Space Act’s quick passage.73 During the Space Act’s Committee
markup hearing, at least one member of Congress scrutinized
the pace at which the Space Act reached markup sessions and
the lack of general understanding of the practical effects it
could have on planetary safety, as well as international trust and
relations.74 Among the most discussed concerns were the Space
Act’s ambiguities surrounding major terms; safety issues; and,
66 Asteroid Mining Could Solve Rare Metal Shortage, MANUFACTURING.NET (Jan. 31,
2020), https://www.manufacturing.net/technology/blog/21113380/asteroidmining-could-solve-rare-metal-shortage#:~:text=asteroids%20can%20be%20
grouped%20broadly,what%20is%20found%20on%20Earth [https://perma.cc/
5DUF-MJ82].
67 Bartlett, supra note 65.
68 Id.
69 Science Desk, Can Asteroid Nereus Be Mined for Metals Worth Billions?, INDIAN
EXPRESS, https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/science/asteroid-ne
reus-mined-metals-worth-billions-7674276/ [https://perma.cc/J6KZ-JQ3V] (Dec.
15, 2021, 5:26 PM).
70 Id.
71 C-Type Asteroids: Facts & Information, NINE PLANETS (Mar. 5, 2020), https://
nineplanets.org/c-type-asteroids/ [https://perma.cc/MVA2-JHUV].
72 See Neel V. Patel, Here’s How We Could Mine the Moon for Rocket Fuel, MIT
TECH. REV. (May 19, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/19/
1001857/how-moon-lunar-mining-water-ice-rocket-fuel/ [https://perma.cc/
NC5Q-GTG9].
73 See, e.g., Group Letter: Opposition to the SPACE Act, a Bill to Immunize Private
Space Companies, N.Y.U.: CTR. FOR JUST. & DEM. (May 20, 2015), https://
centerjd.org/Group%20Letter%20In%20Opposition%20to%20the%20
SPACE%20Act [https://perma.cc/FCW2-S975].
74 See Johnson, supra note 11.
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most importantly, perceived contradictions of express and implied principles in the Outer Space Treaty.75 The latter has been
the focus of many discussions and several articles. For example,
critics of the Space Act point out that legalizing exploitation of
asteroid resources is synonymous to national appropriation by
“other means” as expressly prohibited in Article II of the
Treaty.76 Those critics point out that the definition of “celestial
body” commonly and widely includes asteroids and that the
“loophole” created by Congress—ownership rights in minerals
extracted rather than in the mass they are extracted from—is
nothing more than an inaccurate and insulting splitting of
hairs.77 However, Congress has determined, and it is unchallenged for purposes of this Article, that even though the Space
Act permits exploitation of asteroids, its loophole avoids appropriation and maintains a key consideration of the Outer Space
Treaty, which was the preservation and equitable access to the
Moon and other planets in space.78 That being so, arguments relating to the Space Act’s violation of the appropriation clause in
the Outer Space Treaty were rejected by Congress and are not
the focus of this Article.
Another prominent concern articulated during markup was
the unusual simplicity of the Space Act compared to other legislation at this stage, particularly the ambiguity of key terms and
the overall lack of specificity.79 The Space Act legalized reasonable exploration and utilization of extraterrestrial resources but
failed to identify any structure or guidance for a determination
of a standard of reasonableness consistent with existing international obligations, such as those imposed by the Outer Space
Treaty.80 Furthermore, the Space Act failed to set forth any guiding criteria that would qualify entities to participate in space
75 See Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Floor Statement by Ranking
Member Eddie Berenice Johnson on Senate Amendment to Space Act of 2015
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://science.house.gov/news/press-releases/floor-statementby-ranking-member-eddie-bernice-johnson-on-senate-amendment-to-space-act-of2015- [https://perma.cc/V52V-VRRY].
76 Peter B. de Selding, New U.S. Space Mining Law’s Treaty Compliance May Depend on Implementation, SPACENEWS (Dec. 9, 2015), https://spacenews.com/u-scommercial-space-acts-treaty-compliance-may-depend-on-implementation/
[https://perma.cc/V826-6BAB].
77 Mallick & Rajagopalan, supra note 12, at 11–13.
78 Id. at 11.
79 Johnson, supra note 11.
80 See 51 U.S.C. §§ 51302–51303; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. VI.
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mining, and instead legalized it for anyone capable of doing
so.81
Outside congressional walls, media outlets and space industry
experts express concern that the Space Act poses threats to
physical safety on Earth.82 Many of these commentators point
out that mining operations inherently carry dangerous risks.83
Among these risks include reverse contamination, pollution,
and even asteroid collisions with Earth.84 Most asteroids are not
sedentary, meaning that alteration of their orbital trajectories is
possible.85 Accordingly, if mining entities are not careful in their
operations, they risk altering the trajectories of asteroids near
Earth and other celestial bodies, potentially causing serious and
irrecoverable collisions.86 Critics comment that because of the
lack of standards for authorization and regulation within the
Space Act, entities lacking the technology, knowledge, and even
judgment to safely execute precarious mining operations are
81 See generally 51 U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303 (noting absence of qualifying criteria
or limitation on participation for entities looking to engage in asteroid mining).
82 See, e.g., Joshua Rapp Learn, Asteroid Miners Could Use Earth’s Atmosphere to
Catch Space Rocks, SCI. AAAS (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.science.org/content/
article/asteroid-miners-could-use-earth-s-atmosphere-catch-space-rocks [https://
perma.cc/57PS-V5XN]; see generally Steven J. Ostro & Carl Sagan, Cosmic Collisions
and the Longevity of Non-Spacefaring Galactic Civilizations, JET PROPULSION LAB’Y,
CAL. INST. TECH., May 1998, at 1, 2, 5 https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/bitstream/handle/
2014/19498/98-0908.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R5T-4H2V] [hereinafter Ostro &
Sagan, Cosmic Collisions and the Longevity of Non-Spacefaring Galactic Civilizations];
Steven Ostro & Carl Sagan, Cosmic Collisions and Galactic Civilizations, 39 ASTRONOMY & GEOPHYSICS: J. ROYAL ASTRONOMICAL SOC’Y, 22, 22–24 (1998), https://
web.archive.org/web/20160304193730/http:/abob.libs.uga.edu/bobk/ccc/
cc080498.html [https://perma.cc/SZS3-V9BH] [hereinafter Ostro & Sagan, Cosmic Collisions and Galactic Civilizations]; Carl Sagan & Steven J. Ostro, Dangers of
Asteroid Deflection, 368 NATURE 501, 501 (1994), https://www.nature.com/articles/368501a0 [https://perma.cc/24EW-FPKX] [hereinafter Sagan & Ostro,
Dangers of Asteroid Deflection].
83 Lysette Maurice N. Sandoval, Asteroid Mining: Beneficial or Dangerous?, SCI.
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2019, 5:48 AM), https://www.sciencetimes.com/articles/23554/
20190806/asteroid-mining-beneficial-dangerous.htm [https://perma.cc/M4EN7TDZ].
84 Id.
85 See Nola Taylor Tillman, NASA Tracking Huge Asteroid with Radar for Tuesday
Encounter, SPACE.COM (Nov. 7, 2011), https://www.space.com/13533-huge-asteroid-2005-yu55-radar-tracking.html [https://perma.cc/T95S-5A4S].
86 Learn, supra note 82; see also Ostro & Sagan, Cosmic Collisions and the Longevity
of Non-Spacefaring Galactic Civilizations, supra note 82; Ostro & Sagan, Cosmic Collisions and Galactic Civilizations, supra note 82; Ostro & Sagan, Dangers of Asteroid
Deflection, supra note 82.
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nevertheless free to try their hand at an unknown industry with
potentially deadly consequences.87
C.

MINES

METEORS: PAST AND FUTURE
RESOURCE EXTRACTION LAW

TO

OF

NATURAL

Concerns regarding the regulation of natural resource extraction are nothing new. Every energy sector presently existing involves some type of regulation, is subject to the oversight of
some type of governing body, or is both regulated and subject to
the oversight of a governing body.88 One notable example is the
Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC). For over 100 years, the
RRC has regulated the oil and gas industry to prevent abuses of
power by large companies and to protect public economic and
environmental interests.89 Ironically, the RRC no longer regulates the railroads90 as its name still implies. Today, the RRC
maintains “primary regulatory jurisdiction over the oil and natural gas industry, pipeline transporters, natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline industry, natural gas utilities, . . . and coal
and uranium surface mining operations.”91
As the primary regulatory authority for energy in Texas, the
RRC serves to protect natural resources, the environment, and
the safety of all Texans.92 The RRC, like many other regulatory
authorities, coordinates with multiple agencies, including the
United States Environmental Protection Agency, which commended the RRC on its “outstanding enforcement monitoring
program” for disposal wells and for “exceed[ing] the minimum
performance measure” in its testing and surveillance for Class II
injection wells.93 Like the RRC, other regulatory agencies within
the energy industry play a vital role in promulgating and enforcing adequate measures to ensure safety and efficiency.
1.

Physical Human Safety

The fatalistic history of times when resource extraction regulation was lacking within traditional resource sectors is proof of
See Sandoval, supra note 83; Oduntan, supra note 61.
See Giering & Flickinger, supra note 20.
89 History of the Railroad Commission of Texas, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., https://
www.rrc.texas.gov/about-us/rrc-history/ [https://perma.cc/PWP3-ZVXF].
90 Id.
91 About Us, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., https://www.rrc.texas.gov/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/QMN9-T4SJ].
92 Id.
93 R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., supra note 89.
87
88
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its absolute necessity in contemporary and all future resource
sectors. Far too often has the world been reminded of the dangers that unregulated energy industries and their associated byproducts pose to human health. For example, the Courrières
Mine Disaster is said to have been Europe’s worst mining disaster.94 In 1906, 1,060 miners and 30 other people were killed after a coal-dust explosion destroyed the mine.95 While the cause
of the initial ignition was never determined with absolute certainty, it is widely accepted that ignition resulted from workers
carrying open-flamed lamps96 as opposed to safer, but more expensive, Davy lamps, which enclosed the flame within a mesh
screen, reducing the risk of ignition in flammable
environments.97
The Courrières Mine Disaster is second only to the Benxihu
Coal Mine Fire, which also was caused by a preventable explosion.98 In 1942 in what is now modern-day China, the Benxihu
Coal Mine Fire killed more than 1,500 workers, earning it the
title of worst coal-mining disaster in history.99 Workers were subjected to harsh, unregulated working conditions and died of carbon monoxide poisoning after Japanese operators shut off the
ventilation in order to starve the fire, and their workers, of
oxygen.100
Such catastrophes are not restricted to Eurasia. In the United
States, the Farmington Mine Disaster of 1968 involved a devastating explosion that cost dozens of lives but fortunately led to
the passage of critical mining regulatory legislation.101 Investiga94 See The World’s Worst Coal Mining Disasters, MINING TECH., https://
www.mining-technology.com/features/feature-world-worst-coal-mining-disasterschina/ [https://perma.cc/SL6U-T8B9] (Oct. 25, 2021, 1:29 PM); see also STEPHEN J. SPIGNESI, CATASTROPHE!: THE 100 GREATEST DISASTERS OF ALL TIME 168
(2002 1st ed.).
95 MINING TECH., supra note 94.
96 Id.
97 Brief History of the Miner’s Flame Safety Lamp, MINERSLAMPS, https://
web.archive.org/web/20030826065256/http:/www.minerslamps.net/
homepage/safetylamphistory.htm [https://perma.cc/7FD2-6H99].
98 The
Ten Worst Worldwide Mining Disasters, EPIC DISASTERS, https://
web.archive.org/web/20100418115719/http:/www.epicdisasters.com/
index.php/site/comments/the_ten_worst_worldwide_mining_disasters [https://
perma.cc/UCM2-D53V].
99 See id.; MINING TECH., supra note 94.
100 MINING TECH., supra note 94.
101 Bonnie Stewart & Scott Finn, Memo Suggests Cause of 1968 Mine Deaths, NPR
(Nov. 18, 2008, 6:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=97115205 [https://perma.cc/44FZ-BKZ4].
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tions into the explosion revealed that significant contributing
factors involved inadequate, and in some locations non-existent,
ventilation and a disabled ventilation fan that was responsible
for flushing explosive methane gas from the mine.102 This disaster, though tragic, was a critical step leading to the passage of
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
(CMHSA).103 This Act was the first regulatory action of its kind,
and it greatly increased safety standards in mining operations
and granted mine workers specific health and safety rights, forever changing the landscape of the coal industry104 for the
better.
2.

Environmental Safety

As well as causing physical harm and human casualties, the
failure or lack of extraction regulation has an immensely broad
and long-lasting negative impact on the environment and has
led to several legislative reformation responses.105 In 2014, the
Mount Polley mine in British Columbia, Canada accumulated a
large amount of water held in place by a dam in its tailings facility.106 A tailings facility is usually comprised of one or more
dammed pools used to store water, sand, silt, and ground-up
rock used in the milling process.107 When the dam leaked, the
entire one-and-a-half square mile pool of waste spilled into the
surrounding water supplies.108 The surrounding water sources
subsequently contained increased levels of selenium and arse102 Ken Ward Jr., Lawsuit Alleges Cover-up After 1968 Farmington No. 9 Mine Disaster, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/
news/lawsuit-alleges-cover-up-after-farmington-no-mine-disaster/article_7c414ce5-d80a-5908-b23a-b39908d3dbf3.htm [https://perma.cc/B4WZA7X5].
103 See Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Richard Nixon: Statement on Signing the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Dec. 30,
1969), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws?pid=2389 [https://perma.cc/4AJKPQZE].
104 See id.
105 See What are Environmental Regulations on Mining Activities?, AM. GEOSCIENCES
INST. (Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.americangeosciences.org/critical-issues/faq/
what-are-regulations-mining-activities [https://perma.cc/H6K9-Q54K].
106 Mount Polley Mine Tailings Spill: Imperial Metals Could Face $1M Fine, CBC
NEWS, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/mount-polley-minetailings-spill-imperial-metals-could-face-1m-fine-1.2728832 [https://perma.cc/
6NE6-ZLVK] (Aug. 6, 2014).
107 What Is a Tailings Storage Facility (TSF)?, MINING ASS’N B.C., https://
www.mining.bc.ca/what-tailings-storage-facility-tsf [https://perma.cc/V8TP-JFT8.
108 Yvette Brend, 7 Years Later, 2 Engineers Face Discipline for Actions That Led to
Mt. Polley Mine Disaster, CBC NEWS, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-co-
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nic, and the surrounding areas experienced considerable physical damage.109 Investigatory reports revealed the dam’s breach
was the result of the province’s regulatory body’s—the British
Columbia Ministry of Energy, Mines & Petroleum Resources—
failure to ensure the dam was constructed and operated according to approved plans.110
Likewise, as is the case in most tailing facility failures, “inadequate commitment to safe storage combined with poor management” also led to the disastrous Baia Mare Cyanide Spill in
2000.111 There, a dam breach resulted in 100,000 cubic meters
of cyanide-contaminated water spilling over precious farmland
and into the Somes River.112 The spill, which is referred to as
Europe’s worst environmental disaster since Chernobyl, caused
cyanide levels in the Somes to rise to over 700 times permissible
levels.113 It contaminated the drinking water of over 2.5 million
Hungarians and killed 80% of all aquatic life in the Serbian portion of the Tisza River.114 This environmental tragedy prompted
widespread calls for banning dangerous mining practices, such
as the cyanide heap leaching used there, and awakened Europe’s eyes to the necessity of impactful resource extraction
regulation.115
Overall, the consequences of ineffective or absent regulation
in natural resource extraction law have devastating, long-lasting,
and far-reaching impacts. The disasters detailed above, caused
by failed regulation and a lack of adequate oversight, not only
caused mass human casualties and environmental destruction,
but severely impacted the travel and tourism economies of the
lumbia/discipline-engineers-mount-polley-mine-waste-quesnel-lake-1.6137265
[https://perma.cc/LJE9-EE34] (Aug. 12, 2021).
109 Mount Polley Spill: Testing Finds Elevated Selenium in Fish, CBC NEWS, https://
www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/mount-polley-spill-testing-finds-elevated-selenium-in-fish-1.2744343 [https://perma.cc/G9HL-MM7J] (Sept. 9,
2014).
110 Jose Olivares, U.N. Body Alarmed Over Mining Waste Disasters, NPR (Dec. 2,
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/12/02/
565681233/u-n-body-alarmed-over-mining-waste-disasters [https://perma.cc/
H8B4-XNGT].
111 See id.
112 Emma Batha, Death of a River, BBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2000), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/642880.stm [https://perma.cc/H2D7-GRXQ].
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See id.; Nick Thorpe, Second Cyanide Spill Blights Romania, BBC NEWS (Jan.
26, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1137460.stm [https://
perma.cc/MG7X-FLYW].
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regions where they happened.116 These failures are strong evidence in support of the obvious need for effective regulations in
existing as well as new areas of natural resource extraction in
order to prevent ruinous harm to humans, the environments
they populate, and the economies they rely on.
III.

OVERHAUL TO OVERSEE: U.S. ESTABLISHMENT OF
A REGULATORY AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT AND
ENFORCE OVERSIGHT PROVISIONS FOR ENTITIES IN
OUTER SPACE TO COMPLY WITH EXISTING
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

Space is commonly referenced as the final frontier,117 and
rightfully so. Just as early prospectors once rushed to the West in
search of riches and notoriety,118 today’s billionaires are already
working to stake their claim and make their mark on extraterrestrial commercialization.119 Space offers valuable resources in
quantities unattainable on Earth120 and has driven wealthy investors and private entities to expend vast resources in pursuit of
such resources. As noted above, the Space Act authorizes United
States citizens—and corporations—to legally obtain and possess
minerals mined or extracted from outer space asteroids.121
While many legislators, activists, and foreign bodies challenge
the Space Act’s legality pertaining to Article II of the Outer
Space Treaty’s “sovereignty provision,”122 this Article disregards
the alleged conflict with Article II, as has the United States Con116 See generally Jaume Rosselló, Susanne Becken & Maria Santana-Gallego, The
Effects of Natural Disasters on International Tourism: A Global Analysis, ELSEVIER (Feb.
1, 2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7115519/ [https://
perma.cc/VL7S-Q55H] (discussing why a country that is home to a disaster usually experiences a subsequent decline in tourism).
117 See Giancarlo Genta & Michael Rycroft, Will Space Actually Be the Final Frontier of Humankind?, 58 SCI. DIRECT 287, 293 (Dec. 13, 2005), https://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094576506000130 [https://
perma.cc/43WU-H2BC].
118 California Gold Rush, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/westwardexpansion/gold-rush-of-1849 [https://perma.cc/2394-Z7YV] (Apr. 16, 2021).
119 Swish Goswami, Why the Billionaire Space Race Is a Good Thing, FORBES (Sept.
14, 2021, 11:08 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/
09/14/why-the-billionaire-space-race-is-a-good-thing/?sh=753eb21f2899 [https:/
/perma.cc/WC8G-UUX8].
120 MANUFACTURING.NET, supra note 66.
121 See Goswami, supra note 119.
122 See Mallick & Rajagopalan, supra note 12, at 10–11; de Selding, supra note
76; Johnson, supra note 11; Johnson, supra note 75; N.Y.U.: CTR. FOR JUST. &
DEM., supra note 73.
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gress,123 and instead focuses on fulfillment of and compliance
with Article VI’s oversight requirement. Article VI requires that,
as a signatory to the Outer Space Treaty, the United States must
authorize and continuously supervise the activities of its “nongovernmental entities in outer space.”124 This presents a significant issue because Congress has formally authorized non-governmental mining activities in outer space,125 but it has failed to
establish any regulations for authorization or supervision of
those activities, outside the launching and reentry requisites, as
required by the Outer Space Treaty126 and monitored by the
FAA.127 To comply with existing international obligations,128 the
United States ought to appoint a centralized regulatory authority to govern space mining operations and to adopt bonding and
permitting regulatory amendments to the Space Act. Such measures would create a sufficient framework to bring the United
States Space Act back into compliance with the Outer Space
Treaty by effectively providing for authorization and continuous
supervision of non-government entities in outer space.
A.

POLICING FOR PARSECS: ESTABLISHING A CENTRALIZED SPACE
REGULATORY AUTHORITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Regulatory provisions are only as effective as they are enforceable, and enforceability is nurtured by a strong, central point of
authority.129 Just as the Railroad Commission of Texas is needed
to “regulate[ ] the exploration, production, and transportation
of oil and natural gas in Texas,”130 space mining operations also
123 See generally Mallick & Rajagopalan, supra note 12, at 11 (discussing how the
United States and Luxemburg have exploited a loophole to “author[ize] companies to claim exclusive ownership over extracted resources (but not the asteroid
itself)”).
124 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. VI.
125 See 51 U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303.
126 See generally id. § 51301 (noting absence of qualifying criteria or limitation
on participation for entities looking to engage in asteroid mining).
127 Commercial
Space Transportation, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/faa_regulations/commercial_space [https://perma.cc/9R9Y9MUA] (May 18, 2021).
128 E.g. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. VI.
129 See Charles F. Connolly & Parvin Daphne Moyne, Key Takeaways from FERC
Enforcement’s Energy Trading Compliance and Market Manipulation Law White Papers,
AKIN GUMP (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.akingump.com/en/experience/industries/energy/speaking-energy/key-takeaways-from-ferc-enforcement-s-energytrading-compliance-1.html [https://perma.cc/ZV3H-Z5PH].
130 See Railroad Commission of Texas Transportation Division Special Authority Orders: An Inventory of Railroad Commission Transportation Division Special Authority Or-
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need a regulatory authority to ensure safe standards, protect
public interests, and prevent physical and environmental harm
to not only the planet but also the galaxy. Presently, the Space
Act fails to establish any such authority apart from launch and
reentry requirements guided by the FAA.131 These launch and
reentry requirements are no different than ones used for
launches that will not involve asteroid mining, and do not provide the type of oversight imagined and advised by the Outer
Space Treaty.132 Without a regulatory authority to enforce and
promulgate operational, safety, and other applicable guidelines,
private United States entities are left with nearly limitless
bounds by which to conduct themselves in space mining operations without consideration of the impacts such conduct may
have.133 Such broad allowance is at odds with the language and
intent behind the Outer Space Treaty and has proven worrisome to several of its signatories and their nationals.134
Delegating regulatory authority to an appropriate agency is an
obvious and important first step at the necessary imposition of
effective regulations of space mining activity. Fortunately, the
United States has already established a body that, with input
from other panels and committees, might form the basis of such
an agency: The Department of Commerce’s Office of Space
Commerce (Office of Space Commerce). The Department’s primary objective is the “coordination of space-related issues, programs, and initiatives,”135 and it is certainly poised to establish
ders at the Texas State Archives, 1894–1935, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., https://tx
archives.org/tslac/finding_aids/20087.xml#:~:text=the%20Railroad%20Commission%20of%20Texas%20regulates%20the%20exploration%2C%20production%2C%20and,and%20natural%20gas%20in%20Texas.&text=IT%20oversees
%20hazardous%20materials%20pipelines,gas%2C%2 [https://perma.cc/P6ZZY8ZS].
131 See; FAA, supra note 127; see generally 51 U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303.
132 See Johnson, supra note 11; Johnson, supra note 75.
133 See Nick Stockton, Congress Says Yes to Space Mining, No to Rocket Regulations,
WIRED (Nov. 18, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/11/congresssays-yes-to-space-mining-no-to-rocket-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/585U3L7M].
134 See Interview by David Greene with Eddie Bernice Johnson, Rep., Audrey
Quinn, and Rick Tumlinson, NPR (Dec. 22, 2015 5:06 AM), https://
www.npr.org/2015/12/22/460656826/commercial-space-industry-would-benefitfrom-space-act-critics-say [https://perma.cc/8SZB-5N3D]; see also James Rathz,
Law Provides New Regulatory Framework for Space Commerce, REGUL. REV. (Dec. 31,
2015), https://www.theregreview.org/2015/12/31/rathz-space-commerce-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/9J39-3ZW9] (discussing expert opinions on other nations’ actual and potential responses to passage of the Space Act).
135 51 U.S.C. §§ 50701–50703.
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itself as the governing authority on outer space mining regulations. However, even if the Office of Space Commerce is not
deemed to be the best option for depositing regulatory authority, the importance of appointing a regulatory enforcement
agency remains immense,136 and the United States should expend every effort to identify the best option for delegation.
B.

SAVE OUR SOLAR SYSTEM: BONDING REQUIREMENTS
PRESERVATION AND SAFETY

FOR

Within traditional and even newly emerging energy industries, bonding requirements continuously prove to be highly effective tools used to safeguard against the threats of related
activities,137 and can be equally applicable to safeguarding
against the unique and dynamic threats posed by mining in
space. Bond efficacy is lauded by both sides of a mining operation (the mining company and the impacted residents, governments, and environmental agencies) since the bond process
ensures, among other things, adequate land restoration and
safety requirements without forcing mining companies to immediately expend large amounts of capital that they could otherwise use to develop the project.138 But to effectively safeguard
against the distinguishing threats of outer space asteroid mining, this Article will focus on three main bond provisions: facility
removal estimates, financial assurance for facility removal, and
liability insurance requirements.139
1.

Facility Removal and Surface Restoration Requirement

One of the most important elements of a traditional natural
resource extraction bond is the requirement that companies enSee Ian Christensen, Ian Lange, George Sowers, Angel Abbud-Madrid &
Morgan Bazilian, New Policies Needed to Advance Space Mining, 35 ISSUES SCI. &
TECH., Winter 2019, https://issues.org/new-policies-needed-to-advance-spacemining/ [https://perma.cc/9Z2K-SSXU].
137 See Supporting Sustainable Resource Extraction and Green Investment, U.N. ENV’T
PROGRAMME, https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/green-economy/what-wedo/economic-and-fiscal-policy/fiscal-policy/policy-analysis-5 [https://perma.cc/
2ZRT-5AM9].
138 Mining and the Vanishing Surety Bond Market, FINDLAW, https://corporate.
findlaw.com/business-operations/mining-and-the-vanishing-surety-bond-market.
html#:~:text=because%20surety%20bonds%20allow%20mining,to%20develop
%20a%20mining%20project [https://perma.cc/96SH-A9YT] (Nov. 30, 2017).
139 See infra Sections III.B.1–3 (introducing and explaining proposed regulatory and authorization requirements modeled after existing legislation).
136
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sure the safe and sufficient closure of commercial facilities.140
Within the energy field generally, there is a codified minimal
standard for clean-up procedures depending on the resource
sector, operation, and extraction method.141 This historical pattern of minimal standard codification should not stop with the
advent of asteroid mining. If anything, given the particular and
far-reaching threats presented by space mining, including potential collisions with Earth and backwards-contamination,142
this provision is even more necessary.
While not every asteroid mined will be of the size that warrants establishing a facility on its surface,143 the United States
would be wise to codify minimal standards for facility closure
and cleanup on those that will, but also for various other extraction methods used on smaller sized asteroids. Sloppy or no
clean-up procedures are responsible for billions of dollars in
damages and thousands of lives lost here on Earth.144 Without a
system in place to ensure prevention of similar instances in
space, the effects would be far more devastating and would impact the entire globe.145
All spacefaring nations on Earth are somewhat counter-dependent in space.146 This is evident by the language of the
Outer Space Treaty, which calls for equitable inclusion and in140 James Boyd, Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: An Analysis
of Environmental Bonding and Assurance Rules, U. COLL. LONDON 1, 13, 29–30,
http://www.cserge.ucl.ac.uk/Boyd.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NNY-U5WA].
141 See, e.g., 2 DAVID EBNER, LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES § 24.03, Lexis.
142 Ostro & Sagan, Dangers of Asteroid Deflection, supra note 82, at 501; Sandoval,
supra note 83.
143 Lionel Wilson, Klaus Keil & Stanley J. Love, The Internal Structures and Densities of Asteroids, 34 METEORITES & PLANETARY SCI. 479, 479–80 (Feb. 5, 1999),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1945-5100.1999.tb01355.x
[https://perma.cc/V3YV-ED9V].
144 See, e.g., J.R. Owen, D. Kemp, É. Lèbre, K. Svobodova & G. Pérez Murillo,
Catastrophic Tailings Dam Failures and Disaster Risk Disclosure, 42 INT’L J. DISASTER
RISK REDUCTION 1, 1–3 (2020), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S2212420919306648 [https://perma.cc/PY4U-ZEHY]; MINING TECH., supra
note 94.
145 Cf. Sarah Scoles, Dust from Asteroid Mining Spells Danger for Satellites, NEW
SCIENTIST (May 27, 2015), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22630235100-dust-from-asteroid-mining-spells-danger-for-satellites/ [https://perma.cc/
BYV9-D38W] (discussing the need for containment protocols to avoid dust from
asteroid mining operations harming satellites).
146 CASSANDRA STEER, CTR. FOR ETHICS & THE RULE OF L., UNIV. OF PENN., WHY
OUTER SPACE MATTERS FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 4 (2020),
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/10053-why-outer-space-matters-for-nation
al-and [https://perma.cc/BT4G-M86B].
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ternational cooperation in space exploration.147 Therefore, it is
critical that the United States, as the first nation to legally recognize ownership of extracted space minerals,148 ensures it complies with these notions. Adopting codified minimal facility
closure and cleanup standards is a quality step at protecting international cooperation and care.
The United States should adopt bonding requirement language similar to that adopted by budding wind and solar industries. Unlike the narrowly tailored and complexly limited
application of existing oil and gas legislative regulations,149
newer sectors such as wind and solar serve as uniquely beneficial
examples to model asteroid mining regulation after. The wind
and solar legislation, which the proposition below is modeled
after, incorporates the need for codification of minimal facility
closure standards while using sufficiently broad language that
will apply to various methodologies and processes as they are
developed in real time, and far into the future.150 This is highly
advantageous since not all hazards that asteroid mining
processes will pose can be currently accounted for or predicted.151 After all, no asteroid mining project has commenced.152 The language in wind and solar legislation helps
safeguard against a chilling reality—humans don’t know what
they don’t know.153 Therefore, the following language, modeled
after existing law,154 should be adopted to codify minimal standards for facility closure and site cleanup in all asteroid mining
operations:
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, arts. I, III.
Alex Gilbert, Mining in Space Is Coming, MILKEN INST. REV. (Apr. 26, 2021),
https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/mining-in-space-is-coming [https://
perma.cc/EFR6-HVHA].
149 See Asteroid Mining Might Actually Be Better for the Environment, MIT TECH.
REV. (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/10/19/139664/
asteroid-mining-might-actually-be-better-for-the-environment/ [https://
perma.cc/9FMW-UFXW] (discussing how space mining efforts vary drastically
from those undertaken on and beneath Earth’s surface).
150 See generally TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 301.0003 (West 2022) (noting that the
language is strikingly less complex and more broadly applicable than traditional
oil and gas restoration requirements).
151 See Brandon Specktor, Space Mining Could Ruin Our Solar System If We Don’t
Establish Protected Places Now, Researchers Warn, LIVE SCI. (May 14, 2019), https://
www.livescience.com/65472-scientists-propose-solar-system-national-park.html
[https://perma.cc/BL2U-B7NL].
152 See Gilbert, supra note 148.
153 See Specktor, supra note 151; Ostro & Sagan, Dangers of Asteroid Deflection,
supra note 82, at 501; Sandoval, supra note 83.
154 See TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 301.0003 (West 2022).
147
148
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To the extent possible:
a. Clear, clean, and remove from the asteroid and surrounding
area:
i. All mining materials, devices, refiners, etc.
b. For all foundations and/or pad sites:
i. Clear, clean, and remove the foundation from the surface to an adequate depth below the surface of the
grade of the land in which it is installed.
ii. Ensure that all holes, cavities, or significant impressions created in the surface by the removal are filled
with matter of the same type or similar type as the predominant regolith found on the asteroid.
iii. As near as reasonably possible, return the surface and
surrounding area to the same condition as before operations were commenced.

This language is an important step in ensuring that outer
space remains a global common for the use and enjoyment of
all nations as vehemently prescribed by the Outer Space
Treaty.155 By enforcing facility removal and surface restoration
provisions whenever applicable, the United States will once
again comply with its international obligations in the Outer
Space Treaty156 and exemplify the Treaty’s objective of equitable
international access, enjoyment, and protection.157 Even more
important is the prediction that such action by the United States
could likely serve as an example for how other spacefaring nations should model their own regulations should they choose to
adopt legislation similar to the Space Act.158 After all, the United
States is not the only spacefaring nation looking to profit from
space.159

See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. I.
See generally de Selding, supra note 76 (discussing the need for careful implementation of new space law to ensure compliance with the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty).
157 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, arts. I–III.
158 See Anne-Marie Slaughter & Emily Lawrence, The US and China Must Cooperate in Space, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-china-cooperation-on-commercial-space-activityby-anne-marie-slaughter-and-emily-lawrence-2021-01 [https://perma.cc/9P8TMWUL] (discussing the need for and lasting impacts of cooperation amongst the
United States and China in space, which would set an example for other
countries).
159 See Mallick & Rajagopalan, supra note 12, at 4–5.
155
156
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Financial-Assurance Requirement

As mentioned above, one of the benefits of a bonding process
is assurance of adequate clean up and restoration benefits, while
leaving the company to utilize capital in developing the project.160 However, inherent in this process is the requirement that
someone, or something, assures the proper amount on behalf of
the entity engaging in the mining operation.161 Without adequate assurances of liquidity, the bond is useless at safeguarding
against threats of injury and negative environmental impacts.162
Therefore, just as the Railroad Commission and wind and solar
lessors generally require evidence of financial assurance,163 so
too should space-mining authorities. Logically then, the United
States should adopt the following language, or similar language,
which is modeled after current wind legislation164:
2.

Entity shall obtain and deliver evidence of financial assurance that
conforms to the requirements of this provision to secure performance
of the entity’s obligations to remove all facilities and equipment used
on or around the asteroid and to repair the asteroid’s surface and the
surrounding area.

3.

The amount of financial assurance must be at least equal to the
estimated amount by which the cost of removing facilities and equipment and restoring the asteroid surface and surrounding area to as
near as reasonably possible to the condition it was as of the date the
operation begins.

Immediately, the issue of estimating closure costs comes into
play. While not inherently clear, the best option for choosing an
estimator may very well come in the form of a third-party expert,
as is done in wind and solar leases.165 Leaving estimation to the
company or individual engaging in asteroid mining might result
in deflated figures.166 Companies looking to make a profit from
160 See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 137; Environmental Impact Bonds Pay
for Performance, YALE CTR. FOR BUS. & ENV’T. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://
cbey.yale.edu/our-stories/environmental-impact-bonds-pay-for-performance
[https://perma.cc/8P8C-MV2Z].
161 Boyd, supra note 140, at 1.
162 See id. at 1–2.
163 Summary of Requirements and Responsibilities, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., https://
www.rrc.texas.gov/oil-and-gas/requirements-and-responsibilities/ [https://
perma.cc/FAC7-A59G]; TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 301.0004 (West 2022).
164 See TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 301.0004(a)–(b) (West 2022).
165 Id. § 301.0004(c).
166 Cf. 5 Reasons Not to Use the Restoration Company Recommended by Your Insurance
Carrier, ABBOTTS BLOG, https://abbottsfireandflood.com/blog/5-reasons-not-to-
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an exceptionally expensive mining operation may not be inclined to be 100% forthcoming with their cost analysis, and
could be persuaded by their own ambitions and financial obligations to underrepresent costs of closure and restoration in order
to maximize profit.167
On the other hand, if estimation were left to the government,
corporations might feel slighted by a high estimation prepared
by committees or teams who could, as a result of their lack of
personal economic interest, not be as knowledgeable or diligent
in determining accurate and pertinent costs.168 Such discord between a corporation and its sovereign might lead to adverse economic results.169 If a corporation feels the government is biased
or unfair in its estimation, it may decide to relocate its primary
place of business to another country with more favorable estimations.170 Such possibilities must not allow corporations to strongarm governments into insufficiently low bond calculations, but
in light of the Space Act’s intent to promote space commercialization and American competitiveness within the industry,171
preventing bias from disrupting the balance between corporate
economic interest and federal conservation must be a key contemplation when implementing procedures for determining
costs.
Some might argue that considering the Space Act’s goal to
promote American competition in the space-mining industry,
heavy bonding requirements might serve as deterrents to companies operating from within the United States and could lead
use-the-restoration-company-recommended-by-your-insurance-carrier/ [https://
perma.cc/5W9C-T2EN] (explaining that companies may be inclined to cut corners in order to save money and increase profits).
167 Cf. id.
168 See generally Public Divides Over Environmental Regulation and Energy Policy, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (May 16, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2017/05/16/
public-divides-over-environmental-regulation-and-energy-policy/ [https://
perma.cc/N8AL-JM9N] (discussing how different ideological groups in American politics give different priorities to energy cost savings versus environmental
protection); Lee Rainie & Andrew Perrin, Key Findings About Americans’ Declining
Trust in Government and Each Other, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 22, 2019), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/22/key-findings-about-americans-declining-trust-in-government-and-each-other/ [https://perma.cc/9YWA-VFSQ]
(discussing how Americans increasingly perceive each other as more distrustful
of the federal government).
169 See Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.–Apr. 1990, https://hbr.org/1990/03/the-competitive-advantage-of-nations
[https://perma.cc/726X-Y9DW].
170 See id.
171 51 U.S.C. § 51302(a)(2)–(3).
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to mining entities “shopping around” for more favorable jurisdictions.172 However, this argument ignores one crucial fact—all
current spacefaring nations are signatories to the Outer Space
Treaty and thus are bound by the same oversight requirements
as the United States.173 What is the current difference? Only the
United States has breached international obligations under the
Outer Space Treaty by passing formal legislation legalizing nongovernmental entities’ extraction and possession of outer space
resources, absent a system for authorization and supervision of
those entities.174 Therefore, a third-party expert to which both a
corporation and government mutually agree to the qualifications of could prove to be an effective basis for closure and surface restoration cost estimations, and could provide a valuable
service in the effort to realign United States space-mining allowances with the obligations imposed on it by the Outer Space
Treaty.
Further, because operations often shift in scope or complexity
after the commencement of a project,175 the United States
should include a provision similar to those found in other energy sectors, which require that entities engaged in mining operations periodically provide updated estimates of cost of removal
and restoration for the duration of the project.176 Noting the
possibility that some projects may not extend over a significant
period of time, this provision may not be applicable to every
asteroid-mining operation.177 However, it would be applicable to
long-term, or large-scale, operations with ambiguous timelines
or unspecified end dates. Accordingly, the duration of a project
should at least be a factor in determining the requirement or
frequency of updates.
172 See David Coen, Mattia Guidi & Nikoleta Yordanova, The Logic of Regulatory
Venue Shopping: A Firm’s Perspective, SAGE J. (Mar. 30, 2020), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0952076718814900 [https://perma.cc/
8MA6-KQR7].
173 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8.
174 See Oduntan, supra note 61.
175 See T.S. Kagogo & H. Steyn, Effect of Scope Readiness on Capital Projects in Mining: A Namibian Case Study, 30 S. AFR. J. INDUS. ENG’G (2019).
176 See PWC, FINANCIAL REPORTING IN THE MINING INDUSTRY: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS 93–96 (6th ed. 2012).
177 See generally Michael Belfiore, The Tech We’ll Need to Mine Asteroids, POPULAR
MECHS. (Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/a8038/thetech-well-need-to-mine-asteroids-11644892/ [https://perma.cc/YH63-4W2F]
(discussing the various methods of resource extraction and the degree of difficulty involved with each).
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Liability Insurance Requirement

To protect workers engaged in outer space mining, as well
those who could be adversely affected by outer space mining operations, the United States should impose liability insurance requirements in addition to the facility-closure bonds and
financial-assurance requirements described above. Prior to the
Farmington Mine Disaster of 1968 and the passage of the
CMHSA in 1969, there were limited, if any, remedies available to
the workers harmed or the families of the deceased caused by
the explosion.178 Similar to the pre-Farmington era, the Space
Act does not provide for the health and safety of outer space
mining workers or provide a remedy for those killed, injured, or
otherwise adversely affected by outer space mining
operations.179
However, this does not mean that no one is held accountable
for outer space activity-based liability.180 Under current international law, “a country that launches a space object (or from
whose territory it is launched) is absolutely liable to pay compensation for damages caused by that object on the surface of the
earth or to aircraft in flight.”181 Because the 1972 Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention) imports this liability, the United States
would be internationally liable for damages resulting from the
modification of asteroid trajectory, failure of asteroid-mining
equipment, and all other harmful events resulting from an entity or operation launched from within the United States.182 Depending on the size of the asteroid impacted, or the magnitude
of the mining project, liability could rise to trillions if not

178 Cf. Report on the Farmington Disaster, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Nov. 20,
2008), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/special_reports/report-on-thefarmington-disaster/article_a37bff7d-66cb-5016-812d-1cf25f7d3b29.html (discussing how the victims of the Farmington disaster were not initially given a complete formal federal inquiry).
179 See 51 U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303 (absence of liability coverage criteria for participation in mineral extraction).
180 See Raul Magallanes, If a Satellite Falls, Who is Responsible for Damages?, VIA
SATELLITE (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.satellitetoday.com/government-military/
2011/12/01/if-a-satellite-falls-who-is-responsible-for-damages/ [https://
perma.cc/7YUF-X8MF].
181 Id. (emphasis added).
182 See id.; Liability Convention, supra note 38, arts. II–IV.
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quadrillions of dollars, for which the United States would be responsible for paying.183
To avoid this immense financial liability, the United States
should require that all entities engaging in outer space mining
obtain sufficient liability insurance to cover the costs of potential injury and devastation. This way, in the event of suffering
injury or damage, victims are justly compensated, and not from
the pockets of American taxpayers who do not share in the profits of the operations responsible for the damage.184 Consequently, the United States should adopt the language below or
similar language into liability insurance requirements for outer
space mining entities185:
4.

After an application is approved, but before it is issued, the applicant
shall file a certificate of insurance certifying that they have in force a
public liability insurance policy.

5.

The policy must cover all mining operations of the applicant within
the permitted area and shall afford bodily injury protection, accidental private and public property damage protection, and accidental
business property damage protection in an amount determined by the
[governing authority] to compensate adequately any persons, nation,
or entity damaged because of asteroid-mining or restoration
operations.

6.

The policy must be maintained in full force and effect during the
term of the permit, including the length of all restoration operations.

While determining a figure that is adequate to cover such
costs, and therefore determining the figure sought for insurance, may prove difficult, it could be approached in the same
way as previously suggested for estimating cost of facility removal
and surface restoration: third-party expert determination.186 Use
of third-party experts would help to reduce bias of governments
See Oduntan, supra note 61; Ostro & Sagan, Cosmic Collisions and the Longevity of Non-Spacefaring Galactic Civilizations, supra note 82; Sandoval, supra note 83;
Magallanes, supra note 180.
184 See generally GENEVA INT’L CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING, A GUIDE TO
LIABILITY AND INSURANCE IN MINE ACTION 71–74 (2011), https://
www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131799/Guide-Liability-Insurance-June2011.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8HQ4-DJGS].
185 Modeled after 30 U.S.C. § 1257(f).
186 See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing why using third-party estimators for cost
coverage is beneficial to both sides).
183
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and profit-seeking entities in the same way it would for bonding
requirement estimation.187
Additionally, this flexibly written process would provide a
codified system that is easily adaptable to the experiences realized by completed endeavors. Codification of presently estimated numbers or percentages currently deemed adequate by
various parties would not allow for easy adaptation if completion
of actual mining operations revealed the figures to be inadequate or overly inflated.188 Codifying a determination by a thirdparty expert allows the United States to establish sufficiently
broad legislation that is equally protective as it is adaptable to
real scenarios as this burgeoning industry unfolds.
C.

SLOW

SUPERNOVA: ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY THROUGH
IMPOSITION OF PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS

THE

Permitting processes and requirements within energy industries can serve as controlled barriers to entry, foster considerations for safety and efficacy, establish a record of accountability
and contact, and ensure environmental protection and the
avoidance of waste, among other benefits.189 By vesting permitting power within an appointed regulatory authority, the United
States can effectively maintain a sustainable rate of participation
in asteroid mining. Current mining and even wind regulations
and permitting processes already place restrictions on considerations such as well and turbine spacing and drilling placement
to promote safety and sustainable participation.190 Without regulatory limits upon which or how many entities may conduct
187 See Boyd, supra note 140, at 1; ABBOTTS BLOG, supra note 166; PEW RSCH.
CTR., supra note 168; Rainie & Perrin, supra note 168.
188 See generally STATE FINANCIAL ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS, INTERSTATE OIL &
GAS COMPACT COMM’N (2016), https://iogcc.ok.gov/sites/g/files/gmc836/f/financial_assurances_final_web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4PK-BP3N] (illustrating
codified requirements for financial assurance in oil and gas extraction methods
without a method for adjustment other than legislative amendment).
189 See, e.g., How the UK Planning and Environmental Permitting Systems Work for
Minerals, INST. OF MATERIALS, MINS. & MINING (Mar. 5, 2021), https://
www.iom3.org/resource/how-the-uk-planning-and-environmental-permitting-systems-work-for-minerals.html [https://perma.cc/FQ8C-XCLK]; Paul Boyce, Barriers to Entry Definition, BOYCE WIRE, https://boycewire.com/barriers-to-entrydefinition/ [https://perma.cc/4MZF-PCQR] (Feb. 3, 2021).
190 PAUL DENHOLM, MAUREEN HAND. MADDALENA JACKSON & SEAN ONG, NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, LAND-USE REQUIREMENTS OF MODERN WIND POWER
PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1–4 (Aug. 2009), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy09osti/45834.pdf [https://perma.cc/BFV3-4VEH]; 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.37(a) (2022).
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outer space mining operations in which zones and when, the
United States runs the risk of having authorized a free-for-all
that would mirror the California Gold Rush, but with deadlier
results.191
Unless restrictions on the rate of participation in asteroid
mining are imposed, depletion of resources, atmospheric disruption, environmental pollution and contamination, and violence in response to overcrowding and competing claims could
ensue.192 A permitting process would be an effective strategy to
prevent such threats. Space is regarded as a “global commons,”193 similar to the ocean. While no one can colonize either, they may certainly reap the benefits of outer space
minerals194 just as they can the fish from the sea. But with the
idea of a global commons comes the implied—and in the case
of space, the treaty-based—duty to maintain peace and
security.195
Accordingly, the United States should implement a permitting process for companies seeking to engage in asteroid mining. Such a process should mirror existing standards to establish
sufficient information about the entity, provide the issuing
agency with sufficient knowledge about the proposed project,
and allow for approval or denial to prevent safety and environmental concerns.196
A permitting requirement is important not only for mineral
sustainability but also economic sustainability.197 Without an adequate permitting process to effectively limit participation, there
is no safeguard against the economic instability of prices, which
could result from a mass rush on asteroid mineral extraction by
American entities.198 The Space Act authorizes ownership of asSpecktor, supra note 151; see also APES IN SPACE, supra note 58.
See APES IN SPACE, supra note 58.
193 L.A. Fisk, Space as a Global Commons, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS.,
https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/hlf/1st_hlf_Dubai/Presentations/
26.pdf [https://perma.cc/33XV-WL35].
194 Id.
195 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, arts. I, III.
196 Cf.
Mineral Exploration, Licensing and Permitting, DENTONS, https://
www.dentons.com/en/find-your-dentons-team/industry-sectors/mining/miningoperations/mineral-exploration-licensing-and-permitting [https://perma.cc/
4C8J-ZXYB] (discussing how Dentons helps navigate clients complex regulations
and permitting processes in the mining space).
197 INST. OF MATERIALS, MINS. & MINING, supra note 189; see also DENTONS, supra
note 196.
198 See ENV’T L. INST., WASH. & JEFFERSON COLL., GETTING THE BOOM WITHOUT
THE BUST: GUIDING SOUTHWESTERN PENNSYLVANIA THROUGH SHALE GAS DEVELOP191
192
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teroid mineral resources, but it erects zero barriers to entry.199
As mentioned above, asteroids hold abundant quantities of rare
Earth minerals, which pose enticing profits to those capable of
extracting them.200 However, if the United States does not take
steps to limit rates of participation, a mass rush to harvest space
minerals could lead to a “boom and bust” cycle of space mineral
prices, creating a highly unstable and unsustainable economic
climate.201
If the permitting process is to serve as a barrier to entry by
allowing the governing authority to dictate which entities are allowed to mine and when, that authority will need sufficient information about the applying entity to make an informed
decision. Like the proposed bonding requirements, a permit
process that demands disclosure of scope, extraction methods to
be employed, a reasonably expected duration, and location of
the project will allow a governing authority to carefully evaluate
the proposal under the totality of the circumstances in order to
make a careful judgement on whether to permit an entity to
proceed or not.202 Such evaluation is in the best interest of
global safety203 and may provide one method capable of satisfying the oversight and authorization requirement proscribed by
the Outer Space Treaty. The following language, as modified
from existing standards,204 should be employed:
7.

No entity shall conduct a mining operation unless it first obtains a
mining permit issued by the governing authority.

14–15 (2014), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/gettingboom-final-paper-exec-summary-2014-07-28.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTN7-6XLS]
(discussing how new technologies allow for faster extraction of resources).
199 See generally 51 U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303 (noting lack of statutorily imposed
barriers to entry).
200 Bartlett, supra note 65; MANUFACTURING.NET, supra note 66.
201 See ENV’T L. INST., supra note 198, at 1, 14–15 (discussing history of boom
and bust cycles in mineral resource extraction and proposing policies to avoid
such a cycle in Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale field).
202 See generally Specktor, supra note 151 (detailing the importance of regulatory intervention to protect designated areas of space).
203 See generally Duke, supra note 7 (detailing the inherent risks of conflict in
space and celestial security); STEER, supra note 146, at 2, 4–5 (discussing how
each spacefaring nation is somewhat interdependent in space); Fisk, supra note
193 (noting that space is regarded as a “global commons” requiring unique cooperation and policing among spacefaring nations).
204 See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131.131(a)–(b) (West 2022).
MENT
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In the event this requirement is imposed subsequent to the
initiation of mining projects in outer space, the following provision may be applicable:
8.

Any entity conducting an operation prior to the enactment of this
amendment must immediately file a permit application and may continue to conduct that operation until the commission approves or
denies the application.

Allowing an operator under these circumstances to continue,
rather than halting their project, is important and speaks towards notions of fairness.205 It would be quite prejudicial, and
against the spirit of historical American law, to penalize an operator who has made a significant financial investment in the development of a project under what was, at the time, sufficient
under existing law.206
While initiation and completion of actual outer space mining
operations will reveal other pertinent information that would
aid governing authorities if included in permit applications,207
the following set of information, which mirrors existing law,208
could aid the governing authority in its evaluations of safety and
other applicable considerations until those operations
commence:
9.

The name, address, ownership, and managing officers of the permit
applicant and affiliated persons engaged in the mining operation.

10.

Current or previous space or terrestrial mining permits held by the
applicant, including revocations, suspensions, or bond forfeitures.

11.

The type and method of mining operation, the engineering techniques, and the equipment reasonably expected to be used, including mining schedules, the nature and expected amount of
overburden to be removed or displaced, the depth of excavations if
any, a description of the affected asteroid(s) and surrounding area,
the results of any test borings, test pits, core samplings that have
been gathered from the permit area, or any other scoping or identify-

205 See generally Jane Harris Aiken, Ex Post Facto in the Civil Context: Unbridled
Punishment, 81 KY. L.J. 323, 323–24 (1992) (discussing the inherent prejudice and
inequity imposed by ex post facto punishment devices in the civil context).
206 See id. at 324 (stating that “[t]here is a strong argument to be made that the
framers debated the issue and determined that all retroactive laws were suspect
and that only upon a showing of necessity should a civil law be allowed to have
retrospective effect.”).
207 See Gilbert, supra note 148.
208 See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131.133(1), (4), (5) (West 2022).
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ing tests, and the reasonably anticipated consequences of the mining operation.

The above information includes critical considerations that
weigh heavily on the potential impact an operation could have
on other parties.209 Significant is the consideration of past forfeited bonds or permits.210 Due to the volatile nature of activities
in space and the far-reaching consequences negligent actions
may have,211 entities that have shown a history of non-compliance, both in space and here on Earth, should be harshly scrutinized upon application for further operations.212 Furthermore,
to ensure compliance with this requirement, the United States
might consider statutory penalties for failing to disclose such information, regardless of whether the permit is later approved or
denied. Including such information allows an agency to closely
monitor the histories of individuals and entities wishing to conduct outer space mining operations while statutory penalties
provide an incentive for cooperation and punishment to deter
similar behavior from others.213
In keeping with the spirit of cooperation embodied in the
Outer Space Treaty,214 a unique provision of an effective permitting process could include the submission of the application to
other agencies for comment. While the Office of Space Commerce may be suitable as the governing body authorized to issue
permits, it is certainly not the only established body with valuaSee generally STEER, supra note 146, at 2 (discussing how each spacefaring
nation is somewhat interdependent in space); Fisk, supra note 193 (noting that
space is regarded as a “global commons” requiring unique cooperation and policing among spacefaring nations).
210 See generally Sarah Vogelsong, After Blackjewel Settlement, Virginia Has Coal
Mining Permits No One Wants, VA. MERCURY (Mar. 26, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://
www.virginiamercury.com/2021/03/26/after-blackjewel-settlement-virginia-hascoal-mining-permits-no-one-wants/ [https://perma.cc/L44U-QQYT] (discussing
the negative impact of a company’s forfeited coal-mining permit on the local
community and economy).
211 See Duke, supra note 7.
212 See generally Willie Dodson, Gov. Jim Justice’s Straight Fork Surface Mine Again
Facing Possible Permit Revocation, APPALACHIAN VOICES, https://appvoices.org/
2022/01/19/straight-fork-surface-mine/ [https://perma.cc/NG49-D5L2] (Jan.
20, 2022) (asserting that companies with a history of noncompliance tend to continue not complying in subsequent endeavors).
213 See Gary Banks, Chairman, Productivity Comm’n, Address to the Minerals
Council of Australia’s Annual Industry Seminar, Old Parliament House: “Minimum
Effective Regulation” and the Mining Industry, (June 3, 2003), https://www.pc.
gov.au/news-media/speeches/cs20030603/cs20030603.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MLP9-EF4H] (discussing the importance of incentives in regulation generally).
214 See ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, supra note 37.
209
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ble knowledge or experience in dealing with space-commercialization policy procedures.215
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives; and the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
as well as various other international organizations, are all bodies that may prove to offer valuable considerations in the granting of space mining permits. Responsibilities vested in these
organizations range from reviewing “adequacy of proposed or
existing safety standards”216 to ensuring the United States remains competitive in space-related industry development.217 Accordingly, each body offers unique and valuable perspectives
regarding the regulation and control of space mining
development.
Upon receipt and review of an application, the primary permitting agency may be inclined to submit the application to one
or more of these bodies for comment, as is done in current mining and mineral extraction regulation in some jurisdictions.218
Within a specified time period, the bodies could review the application and return it with any comments they care to make.219
The comments of each agency could be incorporated into a record and furnished to the applicant.220
Such a process would ensure well-rounded and diverse safety
considerations from multiple bodies armed with relevant knowledge.221 Yet for efficiency purposes, great deference regarding
the weight given to such comments should be vested in the permitting authority agency for final approval or denial.222 For
215 Other U.S. Government Agencies Involved in Space Policy & Regulation, GEO. L.
LIBR., https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=1037047&p=7762102 [https://
perma.cc/4XLR-WYX3] (Dec. 8, 2020, 11:22 AM).
216 42 U.S.C. § 2477.
217 Committee Information, U.S. S. COMM. ON COM., SCI., & TRANSP., https://www.
commerce.senate.gov/about#:~:text=these%20issues%20range%20from%20com
munications,%2C%20product%20safety%2C%20and%20insurance [https://
perma.cc/J5PJ-9QPY].
218 See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131.139(a) (West 2019).
219 See id. § 131.139(b).
220 Id. § 131.139(d).
221 See generally GEO. L. LIBR., supra note 215 (discussing the various contributions that each agency offers to space regulation).
222 Cf. Daniel P. Pellegrino, Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen? Local Government
Fragmentation and Economic Growth, DUKE SPACE 4–6, 22 (Dec. 16, 2013), https://
dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/8182 [https://perma.cc/AS5QYNFU] (discussing the dangers that municipal government fragmentation poses
to productivity).
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these reasons, the following language, modeled after existing
legislation,223 may prove useful for incorporation regarding permit application procedures:
12.

The primary permitting agency immediately shall submit copies of
the permit application to all applicable agencies and other agencies
whose jurisdiction to the commission feels the particular space mining operation may affect.

13.

Each of these agencies shall review the permit application and submit any comments the agency cares to make within [x] days of receipt of the application.

14.

An agency’s comments shall include an enumeration of permits or
licenses required under the agency’s jurisdiction.

15.

The comments of each agency shall be made a part of the record,
and a copy shall be furnished to the applicant.

Contemplation of application approval inherently brings
about contemplation of application denial. While not every reason warranting denial of a permit application is currently contemplatable, given the absence of actual experience in outer
space mining,224 special consideration should be given to the
area the applicant seeks a permit for. Just as the Railroad Commission denies permits for disposing of certain wastes in unsuitable areas,225 so too should the permitting authority deny
applications if the area sought to be mined is deemed unsuitable for mining. Factors bearing on suitability should mirror existing law:226
16.

Location sought for mining operation will be deemed unsuitable
and a permit for said area will be immediately declined if:
a. Operations will result in significant damage to important areas of archaeological or scientific value or to internationally
important celestial systems;
b. Operations will affect renewable resource land resulting in substantial loss or reduction of long-range productivity of water
supply;

See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131.139(a)–(d) (West 2022).
See Specktor, supra note 151.
225 See Landfarming, Landtreatment, & Land Application Facilities, R.R. COMM’N OF
TEX., https://www.rrc.texas.gov/oil-and-gas/applications-and-permits/environmental-permit-types/landfarming-landtreatment-and-land-application-facilities/
[https://perma.cc/FS4V-EE57].
226 See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 131.035–131.040 (West 2022).
223
224
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c. Operations are located in an area that is geologically unstable
and may reasonably be expected to endanger life or property;
d. It is advised that the operation will likely cause significant pollution or contamination of Earth or other celestial bodies; or
e. It is determined that the proposed mining operation will unreasonably endanger the health and safety of the public.

The above considerations for suitability will force companies
seeking to engage in mining operations to carefully examine
and survey the areas they desire to mine, thus striking a beneficial balance between efficiency of production and degree of
harm in operations.227
IV.

CONCLUSION

Passage of the Space Act was a necessary step in paving the
way for American competitiveness in the space-mining industry
and space commercialization in general.228 The Space Act gave
long-awaited legal certainty to American corporations looking to
operate asteroid-mining projects and ended an economic stalemate caused by hesitation and concerns regarding legal ownership of extracted minerals.229
Unfortunately, while the Space Act was a solution to one problem, it created another with international effects. By passing the
Space Act, the United States directly contradicted the most basic
and foundational legal framework for international space law:
The Outer Space Treaty.230
Due to its lack of specificity231 and complete omission of regulatory or authorization requirements,232 the Space Act is a dangerous greenlight for all entities with the resources and
capabilities of asteroid mining233 to race to space. Such encouragement is directly opposite to the intent and express condition
of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.234 Article VI, the “oversight requirement,” demands that governments authorize and
continuously supervise activities of non-governmental entities in
227
228
229
230

See
See
See
See

Specktor, supra note 151.
Stockton, supra note 133.
id.
de Selding, supra note 76; Mallick & Rajagopalan, supra note 12, at 2–3,

6–7.
See Johnson, supra note 11.
See 51 U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303.
233 Cf. Goswami, supra note 119 (acknowledging the pending influx of entities
wishing to engage in space mining and evaluating the beneficial economic
impacts).
234 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. VI.
231
232
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space.235 The Space Act, which grants mineral ownership rights
but fails to establish authorization or regulatory oversight provisions limiting participation and conduct,236 falls far from the
sort of supervision and command imagined by the drafters of
the Outer Space Treaty, one of which was the United States.237
While the United States must be mindful to balance notions
of global safety and cooperation with its own economic efficiency and development, the Space Act currently strikes an inequitable distribution leaning too far towards profits with too little
regard for protection. Consequently, steps must be taken to enforce meaningful regulation that fosters American economic
growth within the space industry but also complies with existing
international obligations.
The founding of a centralized regulatory authority to oversee
non-governmental entities in space, implementation of bonding
requirements, and establishment of a permitting process for asteroid-mining operations may suffice to comply with the oversight requirement of the Outer Space Treaty. While outer space
mining varies in many ways from traditional terrestrial mining
operations,238 the two share very similar concerns, but on far different scales.239
Given the knowledge we have of terrestrial mining, and the
inherent complexity and risks associated with outer space mining, imposition of bonding and permitting requirements by a
centralized regulatory authority is highly appropriate. Fortunately, the United States is poised to implement these changes
without significant effort or delay.240 By appointing one, or a
combination of, existing federal agencies with experience in
space policy and commerce241 and implementing bonding and
permitting requirements modeled after existing legislation with
appropriate adjustments,242 the United States will take signifiId. art. VII.
See 51 U.S.C. § 51302.
237 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, pmbl., art. VI.
238 See Belfiore, supra note 177.
239 See Ostro & Sagan, Cosmic Collisions and the Longevity of Non-Spacefaring Galactic Civilizations, supra note 82; Ostro & Sagan Cambridge Conference Correspondence,
supra note 82; Belfiore, supra note 177.
240 See 51 U.S.C. §§ 50701–50703.
241 See supra Section III.A (discussing the proposed structure of a regulatory
authority with input from applicable agencies).
242 See supra Sections III.B.1–.3 (proposing applicable amendments modeled
after existing legislation).
235
236
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cant steps towards compliance with the Outer Space Treaty’s
oversight requirement.
Without establishing a regulatory authority or implementing
bonding and permitting requirements, the United States will
continually fail to meet its international obligations regarding
conduct in space.243 As a drafter of the Outer Space Treaty, the
United States sets a strong example for treaty compliance.244 If
the United States ignores its obligations under the treaty, other
space powers, such as Russia and China, may well choose to do
the same.245 Given the unique characteristics of space and the
United States’ interdependence upon other signatories when
operating above its troposphere, abandonment of the principles
exemplified by the treaty could result in catastrophic threats to
planetary safety and the destruction of the planet.246 Accordingly, it is imperative that the United States imposes the actions
suggested above and meets its international duties assigned by
the Outer Space Treaty.

243 See supra Section II.A.2 (laying out the requirements of the Outer Space
Treaty).
244 See generally Slaughter & Lawrence, supra note 158 (discussing the need for
cooperation amongst Earth’s two most leading space powers, the United States
and China, and how cooperation sets a norm for other countries to follow).
245 See generally id.
246 See generally id.
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V. APPENDIX
SECTION 1: FACILITY REMOVAL AND RESTORATION
REQUIREMENT247
1.

To the extent possible:
a. Clear, clean, and remove from the asteroid and surrounding area:
i. All mining materials, devices, refiners, etc.
b. For all foundations and/or pad sites:
i.
Clear, clean, and remove the foundation from the surface to
an adequate depth below the surface of the grade of the land
in which it is installed.
ii. Ensure that all holes, cavities, or significant impressions created in the surface by the removal are filled with matter of the
same type or similar type as the predominant regolith found
on the asteroid.
iii. Return the surface and surrounding area to as near as reasonably possible to the same condition as before operations
where commenced.

SECTION 2: FINANCIAL-ASSURANCE REQUIREMENT248
2.

Entity shall obtain and deliver evidence of financial assurance that conforms to the requirements of this provision to secure performance of the
entity’s obligations to remove all facilities and equipment used on or
around the asteroid and to repair the asteroid’s surface and the surrounding area.

3.

The amount of financial assurance must be at least equal to the estimated amount by which the cost of removing facilities and equipment
and restoring the asteroid surface and surrounding area to as near as
reasonably possible to the condition it was as of the date the operation
begins.

SECTION 3: LIABILITY INSURANCE REQUIREMENT249
4.

After an application is approved, but before it is issued, the applicant
shall file a certificate of insurance certifying that they have in force a
public liability insurance policy.

5.

The policy must cover all mining operations of the applicant within the
permitted area, and shall afford bodily injury protection, accidental private and public property damage protection, and accidental business

247 Modeled after Required Agreement Provisions on Facility Removal codified
at TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 301.0003 (West 2022).
248 Modeled after Required Agreement Provisions on Financial Assurance
codified at id. § 301.0004(a)–(b).
249 Modeled after Bond and Insurance Requirements for Surface Coal Mining
and Reclamation Operations Under Regulatory Programs codified at 30 U.S.C.
§ 1257(f).
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property damage protection in an amount determined by the [governing
authority] to compensate adequately any persons, nation, or entity damaged because of asteroid mining or restoration operations.
6.

The policy must be maintained in full force and effect during the term of
the permit, including the length of all restoration operations.

SECTION 4: PERMITTING PROCESS AND
REQUIREMENTS250
SUBSECTION 4.1: GENERAL PERMIT REQUIREMENT251
7.

No entity shall conduct a mining operation unless it first obtains a
mining permit issued by the governing authority.

8.

Any entity conducting an operation prior to the enactment of this
amendment must immediately file a permit application and may continue to conduct that operation until the commission approves or denies
the application.

SUBSECTION 4.2: REQUIRED DISCLOSURES252
9.

The name, address, ownership and managing officers of the permit
applicant and affiliated persons engaged in the mining operation.

10.

Current or previous space or terrestrial mining permits held by the applicant, including revocations, suspensions, or bond forfeitures.

11.

The type and method of mining operation, the engineering techniques,
and the equipment reasonably expected to be used, including mining
schedules, the nature and expected amount of overburden to be removed or displaced, the depth of excavations if any, a description of
the affected asteroid(s) and surrounding area, the results of any test
borings, test pits, core samplings that have been gathered from the permit area, or any other scoping or identifying tests, and the reasonably
anticipated consequences of the mining operation.

SUBSECTION 4.3:
AGENCY REVIEW253
12.

PROCEDURAL

PROVISIONS

FOR

The primary permitting agency immediately shall submit copies of the
permit application to all applicable agencies and other agencies whose
jurisdiction to the commission feels the particular space mining operation may affect.

250 Modeled after Chapter 131 Uranium Surface Mining and Reclamation Act
codified at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131 (West 2022).
251 Modeled
after Permit Required for Operation codified at id.
§ 131.131(a)–(b).
252 Modeled after Required Information codified at id. § 131.133(1), (4), (5).
253 Modeled after Submission of Application to Agencies for Comment codified at id. § 131.139(a)–(d).
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13.

Each of these agencies shall review the permit application and submit
any comments the agency cares to make within [x] days of receipt of the
application.

14.

An agency’s comments shall include an enumeration of permits or licenses required under the agency’s jurisdiction.

15.

The comments of each agency shall be made a part of the record, and a
copy shall be furnished to the applicant.

SUBSECTION 4.4: NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF FACTORS
SUPPORTING DETERMINIZATION THAT LOCATION
SOUGHT IS UNSUITABLE254
16.

Location sought for mining operation will be deemed unsuitable and a
permit for said area will be immediately declined if:
a. Operations will result in significant damage to important areas of
archaeological or scientific value or to internationally important
celestial systems;
b. Operations will affect renewable resource land resulting in substantial loss or reduction of long-range productivity of water
supply;
c. Operations are located in an area that is geologically unstable and
may reasonably be expected to endanger life or property;
d. It is advised that the operation will likely cause significant pollution or contamination of Earth or other celestial bodies; or
e. It is determined that the proposed mining operation will unreasonably endanger the health and safety of the public.

254

Modeled after Unsuitability Designation codified at id. §§ 131.035–131.040.

